Carbonell vs. Court of Appeals, and Poncio
Carbonell vs. Court of Appeals, and Poncio
69 SCRA 99
January 1976
FACTS:
On January 27, 1955, respondent Jose Poncio executed a private memorandum of sale of his parcel of land with improvements situated in San Juan, Rizal in favor of petitioner Rosario Carbonell who knew that the said property was at that time subject to a mortgage in favor of the Republic Savings Bank (RSB) for the sum of P1,500.00. Four days later, Poncio, in another private memorandum, bound himself to sell the same property for an improved price to one Emma Infante for the sum of P2,357.52, with the latter still assuming the existing mortgage debt in favor of the RSB in the amount of P1,177.48. Thus, in February 2, Poncio executed a formal registerable deed of sale in her (Infante's) favor. So, when the first buyer Carbonell saw the seller Poncio a few days afterwards, bringing the formal deed of sale for the latter's signature and the balance of the agreed cash payment, she was told that he could no longer proceed with formalizing the contract with her (Carbonell) because he had already formalized a sales contract in favor of Infante.
To protect her legal rights as the first buyer, Carbonell registered on February 8, 1955 with the Register of Deeds her adverse claim as first buyer entitled to the property. Meanwhile, Infante, the second buyer, was able to register the sale in her favor only on February 12, 1955, so that the transfer certificate of title issued in her name carried the duly annotated adverse claim of Carbonell as the first buyer. The trial court declared the claim of the second buyer Infante to be superior to that of the first buyer Carbonell, a decision which the Court of Appeals reversed. Upon motion for reconsideration, however, Court of Appeals annulled and set aside its first decision and affirmed the trial court’s decision.
ISSUE:
Who has the superior right over the subject property?
COURT RULING:
The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s decision and declared the first buyer Carbonell to have the superior right over the subject property, relying on Article 1544 of the Civil Code. Unlike the first and third paragraphs of said Article 1544, which accord preference to the one who first takes possession in good faith of personal or real property, the second paragraph directs that ownership of immovable property should be recognized in favor of one "who in good faith first recorded" his right. Under the first and third paragraphs, good faith must characterize the prior possession, while under the second paragraph, good faith must characterize the act of anterior registration.
When Carbonell bought the lot from Poncio on January 27, 1955, she was the only buyer thereof and the title of Poncio was still in his name solely encumbered by bank mortgage duly annotated thereon. Carbonell was not aware - and she could not have been aware - of any sale to Infante as there was no such sale to Infante then. Hence, Carbonell's prior purchase of the land was made in good faith which did not cease after Poncio told her on January 31, 1955 of his second sale of the same lot to Infante. Carbonell wanted to meet Infante but the latter refused so to protect her legal rights, Carbonell registered her adverse claim on February 8, 1955. Under the circumstances, this recording of Carbonell’s adverse claim should be deemed to have been done in good faith and should emphasize Infante's bad faith when the latter registered her deed of sale 4 days later.
Dizon vs. Suntay
47 SCRA 160
September 1972
Pledge of Immovable
FACTS:
Respondent Lourdes G. Suntay and one Clarita R. Sison entered into a transaction wherein the Suntay’s three-carat diamond ring, valued at P5,500.00, was delivered to Sison for sale on commission. Upon receiving the ring, Sison executed and delivered to the receipt to Suntay. After the lapse of a considerable time without Clarita R. Sison having returned to the ring to her, Suntay made demands on Clarita R. Sison for the return of said jewelry. Clarita R. Sison, however, could not comply with Suntay’s demands because on June 15, 1962, Melia Sison, niece of the husband of Clarita R. Sison, evidently in connivance with the latter, pledged the ring with the petitioner Dominador Dizon's pawnshop for P2,600.00 without Suntay’s knowledge. When Suntay found out that Clarita R. Sison pledged the ring, she filed a case of estafa against the latter with the fiscal's office. Subsequently, Suntay wrote a letter to Dizon on September 22, 1962 asking for the return of her ring which was pledged with the latter’s pawnshop under its Pawnshop Receipt serial B No. 65606, dated June 15, 1962.
Dizon refused to return the ring, so Suntay filed an action for its recovery with the CFI of Manila, which declared that she had the right to its possession. The Court of Appeals likewise affirmed said decision.
ISSUE:
Who has the right title over the subject property?
COURT RULING:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower courts. The controlling provision is Article 559 of the Civil Code which provides that “[T]he possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof may recover it from the person in possession of the same. If the possessor of a movable lost of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor.” The only exception the law allows is when there is acquisition in good faith of the possessor at a public sale, in which case the owner cannot obtain its return without, reimbursing the price. Hanging on to said exception as his basis, Dizon insisted that the principle of estoppel should apply in this case but the Supreme Court ruled otherwise.
In the present case not only has the ownership and the origin of the jewels misappropriated been unquestionably proven but also that Clarita R. Sison, acting fraudulently and in bad faith, disposed of them and pledged them contrary to agreement with no right of ownership, and to the prejudice of Suntay, who was illegally deprived of said jewels and who, as the owner, has an absolute right to recover the jewels from the possession of whosoever holds them, which in this case is Dizon’s pawnshop. Dizon ought to have been on his guard before accepting the pledge in question, but evidently there was no such precaution availed of and he has no one to blame but himself. While the activity he is engaged in is no doubt legal, it is not to be lost sight of that it thrives on taking advantage of the necessities precisely of that element of our population whose lives are blighted by extreme poverty. From whatever angle the question is viewed then, estoppel certainly cannot be justly invoked.
DIZON vs. SUNTAY case digest
Pledge of Immovable
29 September 1972 l Property
Article 559 – Right to Recover Personal Property- Estoppel
Suntay was the owner of a 3 carat diamond ring valued at P5.5k (in 1962). In June 1962, Suntay entered into an agency to sell with Clarita Sison. Unknown to Suntay, Sison pawned the ring to Dizon who owns a pawnshop. Time passed, and Sison failed to sell the ring nor was she able to return the ring to Suntay. Suntay later discovered that the ring was actually pawned. She demanded Dizon to return the ring. Dizon refused. Suntay filed for a replevin suit which she won. Dizon appealed and he lost. He claims that estoppels should be used against Dizon as she left the ring under the custody of Sison who then pawned it to her.
ISSUE: Whether or not Suntay can still claim the ring.
HELD: Yes. Suntay can under Article 559 of the Civil Code which provides:
‘The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof may recover it from the person in possession of the same. If the possessor of a movable lost of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor.’
Dizon must bear the burden due to his misplaced confidence. Suntay’s right over the ring is superior to that of Dizon.
Estoppel may not be used against Suntay. She is the rightful owner merely exercising her right to recover. Neither the promptings of equity nor the mandates of moral right and natural justice come to Dizon’s rescue. He is engaged in a business where presumably ordinary prudence would manifest itself to ascertain whether or not an individual who is offering jewelry by way of a pledge is entitled to do so. If no such care be taken, perhaps because of the difficulty of resisting opportunity for profit, he should be the last to complain if thereafter the right of the true owner of such jewelry should be recognized.
AZNAR V.YAPDIANGCO
13 SCRA 486
Stolen Goods
FACTS:
Theodoro Santos advertised in the newspapers the sale of his Ford Fairlane 500. After the advertisement, a certain de Dios, claiming to be the nephew of Marella, went to the residence of Santos and expressing his uncle’s intent to purchase the car. Since Santos wasn't around, it was Irineo who talked with de Dios. On being informed, Santos advised his son to see
Marella, which the son did. Marella expressed his intention to purchase the car. A deed of sale was prepared and Irineo was instructed by his father not to part with the deed and the car without receiving the purchase price from Marella. When irineo and de Dios arrived at the residence of Marella, the latter averred that his money was short and had to borrow from his sister. He then instructed de Dios and Irineo to go the supposed house of the sister to obtain the money with an unidentified person. He also asked Irineo to leave the deed to have his lawyer see it. Relying on the good faith of Marella, Irineo did as requested. Upon arriving at the house of Marella’s supposed to be sister, de Dios and the unidentified person then disappeared together with the car. This prompted Santos to report the incident to the authorities. Thereafter, Marella was able to sell the land to Aznar. And while in possession of the car, police authorities confiscated the same. This prompted Aznar to file an action for replevin.
HELD:
Marella never had title to the car as the car wasn't ever delivered to him. While there was a deed of sale in his favor, he was only able to obtain possession of the car since he stole it from Santos. The applicable law is Article 559. The rule is to the effect that if the owner has lost a thing, or if he has been unlawfully deprived of it, he has a right to recover it, not only from its finder, thief or robber, but also from third persons who may have acquired it in good faith from such finder, thief or
robber. The said article establishes 2 exceptions to the general rule of irrevindicabilty—to wit, the owner has lost the thing or has been unlawfully deprived thereof. In these cases, the possessor cannot retain the thing as against the owner who may recover it without paying any indemnity, except when the possessor acquired it in a public sale. Furthermore, the common law principle that where one of two innocent persons must suffer a fraud perpetrated by another, the law imposes the loss upon the party who, by his misplaced confidence, has enable the fraud to be committed, cannot be applied in this case, which is covered by an express provision of law.
CHUA KAI V. KAPUNAN, 104 PHIL 110- Possession of Chattels
Possession of chattels in GF is equivalent to title until ordered by the proper court to restore the thing to the owner who was unlawfully deprived thereof. The presumptive owner is entitled to the enjoyment and holding of the thing.
FACTS:
Soto purchased from Youngstown Hardware 700 galvanized iron sheets and round iron bars. He issued as payment a check drawn against Security Bank. Soto then sold the sheets, some of them to Chua Hai. Meanwhile, the check issued for payment was dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. This prompted the hardware store to file a case of estafa against Soto and prayed for the return of the sheets. This was opposed by Chua on the part of the sheets he purchased. Notwithstanding this opposition, the court ordered for its return.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Chua has the right to retain possession?
HELD: Yes.
To deprive Chua, who was in good faith, of the possession of the sheets, may it be temporarily or permanently, is in violation of the rule laid down in Article 559. Possession of chattels in good faith is equivalent to title, until ordered by the proper court to restore the thing to the owner who was illegally derpived thereof. Until such decree is issued, the possessor as presumptive owner is entitled to the enjoyment and holding of the thing. Further, the hardware store or Ong was not unlawfully deprived of the sheets. There was a
EDCA PUBLISHING v. SANTOS
Possession of Movable property
Possession of movable property acquired in GF is equivalent to title. There is no need to produce a receipt.
FACTS:
EDCA Publishing sold 406 books to a certain Professor Jose Cruz who ordered these by telephone, which was agreed to be payable on delivery. The books were subsequently delivered to him with the corresponding invoice, and he paid with a personal check.
Cruz then sold the 120 of the books to Leonor Santos who asked for verification, and was then showed the invoice for the books.
EDCA became suspicious when Cruz ordered another set of books even before his check cleared. Upon investigation, EDCA found that he wasn’t the person he claimed to be (Dean in DLSU). EDCA had the police capture Cruz, as well as seize the books from Santos. Santos demanded the return of the books.
RTC granted the writ of preliminary attachment.
Subsequent dishonor of a check, which did not render the contract of sale void does not amount to unlawful deprivation of property. (There was a perfected contract of sale so the proper remedy is specific performance)
ISSUE:
Whether or not the owner was unlawfully deprived of the property?
HELD: No.
Santos was a good faith buyer after taking steps to verify the identity of the seller. When she was showed the invoice, she reasonably believed that he was a legitimate seller.
With regard to unlawful deprivation, EDCA was not unlawfully deprived of the property by mere failure of consideration. There was already a perfected contract of sale. Proof was even substantiated when EDCA gave the invoice as proof of payment upon delivery of the books. This did not amount to unlawful taking, because by the delivery of EDCA to Cruz, ownership of the books already transferred to him.
DE GARCIA V. COURT OF APPEALS/ GUEVARA- Buying Lost or Stolen Goods
(Art 559) One who has lost or has been unlawfully deprived of any movable may recover the same from the possessor except when the owner has been unlawfully deprived of it and it has been obtained by the latter in good faith at a public sale wherein the former needs to reimburse the latter of the price paid.
:. THE ONLY EXCEPTION is acquisition in good faith of the possession at a public sale.
FACTS:
Mrs. Guevara owned a pretty diamond ring with white gold mounting, 2.05 diamond-solitaire, and 4 brills. Sometime in February 1952, the ring was stolen from her house. Luckily, on October 1953 (barely a year after), she found it at a restaurant, La Bulakena, on the finger of the restaurant owner, Consuelo De Garcia.
Guevara asked De Garcia where she bought it and explained to her how she had lost it. When the ring was handed to her by De Garcia, it fitted her perfectly. The next time around, she brought her husband and Rebullida, the person whom she bought the ring from, to verify the identity of the ring. Rebullida examined the ring with the aid of high power lens and his 30 years of experience. He concluded that it was the very ring that he had sold to the Guevaras. After that, Guevara sent a written request for the ring, but De Garcia did not deliver it. When the sheriff tries to serve a writ of seizure, De Garica likewise refused to deliver the ring.
According to De Garcia, she bought the ring from her kumare who got it from another Miss who in turn got it from the owner, a certain Aling Petring. Aling Petring however, was nowhere to be found. She boarded three months at the first buyer’s house but left a week after her landlady bought the ring. The first buyer did not even know Aling Petring’s last name nor her forwarding address.
De Garcia claims to be a holder in good faith and for value. She says her possession is equivalent to title.
[Note: There was a discrepancy as to the weight of the ring at the time it was purchased and at the time it was found, but this was because De Guevara substituted the diamond-solitaire with a heavier stone.]
The lower court both ruled in favor of the buyer and CA reversed in favor of the owner, Guevara. Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE: Who has a better right?
RULING: Guevara (owner)
Article Article 559 again, applies. Remember that the article establishes two exceptions to the general rule of irrevindicability: when the owner (1) has lost the thing, or (2) has been unlawfully deprived thereof. In these cases, the possessor cannot retain the thing as against the owner, who may recover it without paying any indemnity. THE ONLY EXCEPTION is acquisition in good faith of the possession at a public sale.
There is no merit in the contention that De Garcia’s possession is in good faith, equivalent to title, sufficed to defeat the owner’s claim. Possession in good faith does not really amount to title for the reason that there is a period for acquisitive prescription for movable through “uninterrupted possession” of 4 years.
The title of the possessor in good faith is not that of ownership, but is merely a presumptive title sufficient to serve as a basis for acquisitive prescription. This, one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from the person in possession of the same.
Besides, De Garcia’s “title”, if any, was weak. Her source, Aling Petring, was dubious. She did not make a comment when Rebullida examined the ring nor did she answer Guevara’s letter asserting ownership of it. Her testimony was weak!
Other facts
1. Subject matter = 1 diamond ring 18 cts. white gold mounting, with 1 2.05 cts. diamond-solitaire, and 4 brills 0.10 cts. total weight.
2. Mr. Rebullida’s experience in the jewelry business = 30 years
3. Mrs. Garcia = owner of La Bulakeña restaurant
4. Weight of the diamonds:
5. substituted diamond = 2.57 cts.
6. lost diamond (guevara’s) = 2.05 cts
7. Ruling of the CA = return the ring or pay P1,000 and costs, P1,000 (atty’s fees) & P1,000 as exemplary damages
CRUZ v. PAHATI
Effects of Possession
The common law principle that the one who has made the happening of fraud possible through misplaced confidence must suffer the consequence cannot be applied since there is an express provision covering the case. Article 559, a statutory provision, prevails over a common law principle.
FACTS:
Jesusito Belizo is a second hand car dealer who sold an automobile (not indicated what type) to plaintiff Jose Cruz. After a year, Belizo offered to sell the sell the same car to a certain buyer. Plaintiff agreed and since the certificate of registration was missing, Cruz made a letter addressed to the Motor Section of the Bureau of Public Works for the issuance of a new certificate.
Cruz gave the letter to Belizo to be submitted to the said office and he gave the car as well on the latter’s pretext that he was going to show it to a prospective buyer. The letter was falsified, making it appear that a deed of sale was executed in favor of Belizo, who then got a certificate of registration on his name.
Belizo was able to sell the car to respondent Bulahan who later sold it to Pahati, but the sale was cancelled so the car went back to Bulahan.
ISSUE:
Between two innocent and parties in good faith, who has a better right over the property?
HELD:
Cruz, the original owner has the better right for it cannot be disputed that plaintiff had been illegally deprived through ingenious schemes by Belizo and that Art 559 and 1505 are applicable in this situation.
1. Art 559 clearly indicates that the one who has lost any movable or has been lawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from the person in possession of the same and the only defense is if the other party has acquired it in good faith and at a public sale.
2. Art 1505 clearly says that in cases where a sale is made not by owner and was made without authority, the buyer acquires no better right than that of the seller unless the owner is estopped.
Moreover, if Bulahan had been more diligent, he could have seen that the letter had an erased portion which could’ve aroused his suspicion and made him conscious on making inquiries which he failed to do.
The contention of Bulahanan re common law principle that the one who has made the happening of fraud possible through misplaced confidence must suffer the consequence cannot be applied since there is an express provision covering the case.
DE GARCIA V. COURT OF APPEALS/ GUEVARA- Buying Lost or Stolen Goods
(Art 559) One who has lost or has been unlawfully deprived of any movable may recover the same from the possessor except when the owner has been unlawfully deprived of it and it has been obtained by the latter in good faith at a public sale wherein the former needs to reimburse the latter of the price paid.
:. THE ONLY EXCEPTION is acquisition in good faith of the possession at a public sale.
FACTS:
Mrs. Guevara owned a pretty diamond ring with white gold mounting, 2.05 diamond-solitaire, and 4 brills. Sometime in February 1952, the ring was stolen from her house. Luckily, on October 1953 (barely a year after), she found it at a restaurant, La Bulakena, on the finger of the restaurant owner, Consuelo De Garcia.
Guevara asked De Garcia where she bought it and explained to her how she had lost it. When the ring was handed to her by De Garcia, it fitted her perfectly. The next time around, she brought her husband and Rebullida, the person whom she bought the ring from, to verify the identity of the ring. Rebullida examined the ring with the aid of high power lens and his 30 years of experience. He concluded that it was the very ring that he had sold to the Guevaras. After that, Guevara sent a written request for the ring, but De Garcia did not deliver it. When the sheriff tries to serve a writ of seizure, De Garica likewise refused to deliver the ring.
According to De Garcia, she bought the ring from her kumare who got it from another Miss who in turn got it from the owner, a certain Aling Petring. Aling Petring however, was nowhere to be found. She boarded three months at the first buyer’s house but left a week after her landlady bought the ring. The first buyer did not even know Aling Petring’s last name nor her forwarding address.
De Garcia claims to be a holder in good faith and for value. She says her possession is equivalent to title.
[Note: There was a discrepancy as to the weight of the ring at the time it was purchased and at the time it was found, but this was because De Guevara substituted the diamond-solitaire with a heavier stone.]
The lower court both ruled in favor of the buyer and CA reversed in favor of the owner, Guevara. Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE: Who has a better right?
RULING: Guevara (owner)
Article Article 559 again, applies. Remember that the article establishes two exceptions to the general rule of irrevindicability: when the owner (1) has lost the thing, or (2) has been unlawfully deprived thereof. In these cases, the possessor cannot retain the thing as against the owner, who may recover it without paying any indemnity. THE ONLY EXCEPTION is acquisition in good faith of the possession at a public sale.
There is no merit in the contention that De Garcia’s possession is in good faith, equivalent to title, sufficed to defeat the owner’s claim. Possession in good faith does not really amount to title for the reason that there is a period for acquisitive prescription for movable through “uninterrupted possession” of 4 years.
The title of the possessor in good faith is not that of ownership, but is merely a presumptive title sufficient to serve as a basis for acquisitive prescription. This, one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from the person in possession of the same.
Besides, De Garcia’s “title”, if any, was weak. Her source, Aling Petring, was dubious. She did not make a comment when Rebullida examined the ring nor did she answer Guevara’s letter asserting ownership of it. Her testimony was weak!
Other facts
1. Subject matter = 1 diamond ring 18 cts. white gold mounting, with 1 2.05 cts. diamond-solitaire, and 4 brills 0.10 cts. total weight.
2. Mr. Rebullida’s experience in the jewelry business = 30 years
3. Mrs. Garcia = owner of La Bulakeña restaurant
4. Weight of the diamonds:
5. substituted diamond = 2.57 cts.
6. lost diamond (guevara’s) = 2.05 cts
7. Ruling of the CA = return the ring or pay P1,000 and costs, P1,000 (atty’s fees) & P1,000 as exemplary damages
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